The announcement by Craig Venter last week that his eponymous institute has “rebooted” a cell using a made-from-scratch length of DNA has excited the usual round of pronouncements that a milestone has been reached, that Venter is the first scientist to truly “play God.” This ambiguous assertion is in some cases accompanied by demands that synthetic genomics cease and desist, and that if necessary there should be a government ban. The world of science got a remarkably similar shock in 1828 when Friedrich Wohler first synthesized an organic compound from non-organic chemicals. But more on that in a moment.

The objections are of two kinds. The first is that this technique significantly aggravates threats of bioerror, enabling some unintended environmental threat, or bioterror, the hostile use of synthetic biology. The second objection is that, in creating from non-life (in this case, a string of chemicals arranged as base pairs), a fundamental line has been breached, that God-playing in the laboratory has finally and truly arrived.

The first objection has some merit, though not as much as is often claimed—at least not in the short or mid-term—and is not unique to synthetic biology. New forms of governance will be needed, as is the case for all innovation and in particular for modern biology. The possibility of human error will need to be addressed as it always is, through education, cultural change among scientists, systems of accountability and record keeping, and perhaps licensure and accreditation. While we may not agree that Venter’s experiment is “the quintessential Pandora’s box moment,” improved governance of biotechnology at both the domestic and international levels for biotechnology should be on the agenda.

Biological weapons for tactical purposes have never much panned out. Anyone who’s interested still has quite a selection provided by Mother Nature; it’s hardly necessary to order DNA synthesizers. Building a stronger and more uniform public health system is still our best defense, along with a good dose of public trust in the event it becomes necessary for authorities to request citizen cooperation in curtailing travel. In the long run, while some will be tempted to try to impose phony “secrecy” systems, the experience with the atomic bomb should have taught us the limitation of that approach. And unlike atomic physics, it is increasingly easy to do biotechnology in modest settings. Openness is the best response to dual use, the fact this new technology could be used for ill and for good.

(And speaking of the Bomb, it’s worth pondering why people get so much more nervous about a new biology paper than they do all those thousands of nuclear warheads around the world.)

The second objection, that Craig Venter and his colleagues have played God by creating synthetic life, thereby crossing a line, has of course been heard many times before. In the case of Venter et al.’s work however, no less a theological authority than the Vatican pronounced it acceptable if used to treat disease and clean up the environment. Yet at least one official of the Italian bishops’ conference said that scientists “should never forget there is only one creator: God.”

Whether synthetic biology brushes up too closely to this theological boundary or not, scientists long ago ventured well into that frontier. At least if one takes the formulation of Genesis 2:7 as the definition of God-playing, that distinction appears to have first been achieved in 1828, just ten years after Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein established the paradigm for worries about hubristic science. Friedrich Wohler, while teaching chemistry in Berlin, applied ammonium chloride to silver isocyanate to produce urea, the main nitrogen-carrying compound found in the urine of mammals. In so doing he synthesized an organic substance from non-organic matter. Life from dust. It was something the chemistry of the day took to be impossible, assuming that life could only come from life. Wohler’s modest experiment proved them wrong, utterly changed organic chemistry, and laid down a philosophical marker—or perhaps kicked one over.

What is clear is that the latest event in synthetic biology is one step in a long path. Whatever challenge it may pose to our contemporary assumptions, it would be foolish to reject wisdom from any source in helping us decide where the path should lead, divine ones included.

Jonathan D. Moreno, Ph.D., is the David and Lyn Silfen University Professor of Ethics and Professor of Medical Ethics and of the History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Editor-in-Chief of Science Progress.

The president instructed Gutmann that the report should consider the “potential medical, environmental, security, and other benefits of this field of research, as well as any potential health, security or other risks.” He also asked that “the Commission should develop recommendations about any actions the Federal government should take to ensure that America reaps the benefits of this developing field of science while identifying appropriate ethical boundaries and minimizing identified risks.” Finally, he directed the Commission to “consult with a range of constituencies, including scientific and medical communities, faith communities, and business and nonprofit organizations.” The Commission will have six months to deliver its recommendations.

The inquiry should open an inclusive dialogue on the material and ethical implications of the research while emphasizing pragmatic action for the government to take. Eric Meslin, former director of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission under President Clinton, wrote in a recent article for Science Progress that “deliberations must not only be rigorously supported by good science and good ethics, but must also include strategies to translate its recommendations into implementation.” Citing his experience with NBAC in the mid-1990s, he presciently warned that “even when you plan to take a slow and steady approach to developing the commission’s working style, along comes a cloned sheep from Scotland or the unexpected announcement of the isolation and culture of human embryonic stem cells to throw a wrench into existing priorities. The PCSBI should expect the unexpected.”

The announcement of the first organism “booted up” from a synthetic genome is a similarly monumental breakthrough, and an unexpected but welcome opportunity.

• advance our understanding of basic biology
• create new vaccines, drugs and diagnostic tools
• repair diseased tissues
• engineer new carbon-neutral energy sources
• provide countermeasures for polluting environmental toxins

Synthetic biology, or “synbio,” is a relatively new laboratory discipline that involves creating or altering new life forms. The basic tools of synbio are standard biological parts—sets of genes and chromosomes with known and specific functions created in modern biology labs—that can be assembled to program cells and control an organism’s functions. The process resembles computer programming in that scientists assemble blocks of genetic “code” into instructions for tiny cellular machines.

“Biobricks” are standard, interoperable pieces of DNA for genetic engineering. They are already widely available from commercial websites and the relevant skills for creating them are known to any reasonably competent biology graduate student. Taking advantage of rapid advances in gene sequencing, even college students are learning the techniques. Engineers use biological parts like genes, proteins, and portions of chromosomes to build new microscopic organisms that behave in certain ways. Synthetic biology is only in its infancy, and it will likely be combined with such other emerging fields as nanotechnology to create entities that blend the mechanical and biological.

Synbio nonetheless raises a wide variety of issues that will need to be addressed through a combination of monitoring and regulatory measures, without inappropriate restrictions that block innovation. These issues include:

• Potential environmental hazards due to the accidental release of man-made organisms that may turn out to be harmful and difficult to eradicate
• The possibility that treatment-resistant bacteria or viruses could be synthesized for use in biological warfare
• The risky combination of portions of genes from a human source with those from a non-human source, whether biological or non-biological

For other reasons individuals across the social and political spectrum may also find synbio intrinsically objectionable. The matters of potential cultural concern are far more complex than those faced in the stem cell debate. Many will not view the creation of new life forms capable of performing specific tasks as morally neutral. Political realignment around “naturalness” is a phenomenon that has become familiar in other areas, such as human cloning and genetically modified organisms. A similar reaction could apply to synthetic biology as its implications enter popular awareness.

These worries need to be addressed with seriousness and candor. Scientists and investors rightly complain that inappropriate regulation can impair the development of a new field, yet the rise and fall of public interest in and support of gene therapy should serve as a cautionary tale. Experience has shown that a single adverse event can have an enormous impact on public perception. Ever since the French Enlightenment, trust in scientists has been a crucial component of public support of scientific and technological innovation.

Governance of biotechnology has several elements. Self-policing by the scientific community is necessary but not sufficient. In this field there is an irreplaceable role for smart government, but authority for oversight and regulation of synbio in the United States is currently at best a partial patchwork. The National Institutes of Health require labs receiving its funds to comply with Recombinant DNA guidelines; the Food and Drug Administration would have to approve a drug created by synbio; and the Department of Agriculture might be responsible for avoiding the environmental release of synthetic organisms. But current regulations may not address unique risks posed by the technology.

Nor will merely domestic arrangements be enough. The context for the scientific and commercial interest in the field is a research and development system that has in the past decade or so become globalized to an unprecedented degree. International cooperation and continued scrutiny at many levels of government will be required, as technology will almost certainly rush ahead of current conventions. Researchers and their supporters should also seek innovative approaches for verifying the character and safety of new life forms created through synbio.

Over the long term, the social and scientific impetus behind synthetic biology will overcome political posturing. The greater danger is that through overreaction and misunderstanding we could miss an early opportunity to engage in careful assessment of the research and the development of improved or new regulatory models to avoid harms and maximize the potential benefits of synbio for the common good.  The industrial platforms that this technology is helping to develop will be key components of prospering national economies and national security systems over the next fifty years. America can and must be among the leading innovators.

Jonathan D. Moreno, Ph.D., is the David and Lyn Silfen University Professor of Ethics and Professor of Medical Ethics and of the History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Editor-in-Chief of Science Progress.

More on synthetic biology from Science Progress:

Ribosomes Rising: Synthetic Biology Accelerates
By Jonathan D. Moreno

Synthetic Biology: An Overview and Recommendations for Anticipating and Addressing Emerging Risks
By Denise Caruso

All Together Now: As Emerging Technologies Converge, So Should Ethical Discussions

Interview: David Deamer Explains Synthetic Life: Unpacking the Latest Advance in Biology
Interview by Andrew Plemmons Pratt

The ability to develop more complex artificial proteins is a reminder of the speed with which synthetic biology is developing. In “synbio,” biological parts like genes, proteins, and whole chromosomes are used to build new microscopic organisms that behave in certain ways, like producing specialized chemicals. Faster and cheaper DNA sequencing is a key technology that is making synbio practical for a range of purposes.

Previously scientists have been constrained in their experiments with proteins by the inability to introduce more than one modification at a time. The new technique developed at Cambridge enables significantly more flexibility by creating a parallel set of genetic information readable by specially modified ribosomes. Normally, ribosomes read messenger RNA in units of three nucleotides called codons, each of which corresponds to a specific amino acid. The altered ribosomes can also read “quadruplet codons” of four nucleotides and translate them into 256 protein building blocks.

Interestingly, the UK team tested their technique by culturing their new ribosomes with an antibiotic resistance gene with four codons. The designer ribosomes read the gene and produced the antibiotic resistance protein. Although the test selected surely seemed innocuous to the scientists, and is a standard way to assess such lab-designed alterations, one of the principle worries about synthetic biology is that novel biological weapons could be created by people with relatively modest lab skills who are malevolent or just careless. The biological parts or “biobricks” are in many cases available on the open market. Experts on biological weapons are concerned that antibiotic resistant organisms could be engineered either by nations or non-state actors.

Yet this research is crucial for a better understanding of cellular systems and for developing new and beneficial polymers. An encouraging example of openness and opportunity in the world of snybio was recently described in The New York Times Magazine, a 100-college competition called iGEM, the International Genetically Engineered Machine Competition. As part of the contest, over 1,000 students learned how to use the tools of synthetic biology in order to make new products like more powerful pharmaceuticals, new fuel sources, nutrient-rich crops, or even biologically based computer monitors.

But what iGEM is mainly cultivating is the young engineering talent so badly needed at a time when people in their 20s are in danger of falling behind during a recessionary period. Research like that done at the Cambridge lab is the basic science needed for the iGEMers to do their applied work. The lesson here is that the lab doors need to be kept open.

The progressive response to synbio is more, not less, science. The more knowledge that is gained, the better prepared the scientific community is to establish a culture of responsibility, develop practical regulation, impose sanctions and, at the extremes, develop counter-measures for dual-use discoveries.

Jonathan D. Moreno, Ph.D., is the David and Lyn Silfen University Professor of Ethics and Professor of Medical Ethics and of the History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Editor-in-Chief of Science Progress.

So if citizens aren’t familiar with a technology that researchers currently use to create antimalarial drugs and that major players in the energy industry want to use to churn out biofuels, you just tell them more, right? As Huston Chronicle science reporter Eric Berger points out, not necessarily. “Surprisingly — and this should sober scientists in the field — when the poll respondents were told more about synthetic biology, they became more concerned,” he observes.

The approach explained in the survey report is what science communication experts call the “deficit model”: explain how a scientific process works and hope that people will get behind it when they know more. As Rick Borchelt and Kathy Hudson explained here at SP:

The basic assumption behind these models is that there is a linear progression from public education to public understanding to public support, and that this progression—if followed—inevitably cultivates a public wildly enthusiastic about research. But this model of scientific engagement with the public obviously isn’t working.

The survey doesn’t argue for generating public support for synthetic biology by pursuing a deficit model, but its findings, as Berger makes clear, demonstrate the problems with the approach. In fact, after hearing a short explanation about the potential benefits of synbio (treating disease and cancer, generating renewable energy, reducing pollution) and the risks (unknowns, potential pollutants bioweapons, and ethical concerns), listeners often decided that the risks will outweigh the benefits:

Looking at the survey and the recent New Yorker article on synbio side-by-side is a useful demonstration of how a concrete narrative can present the benefits of an emerging technology in an easy-to-grasp and positive light. Michael Specter ‘s story opens with a history of how scientists developed artificial artemisinin, a powerful treatment for malaria strains that are resistant to other drugs. The development of bacteria that manufacture the compound is considered the poster-child example of synbio benefits.

Specter then goes on to profile thoughtful scientists like Drew Endy, who are fully cognizant of the ethical implications of engineering life and want to engage policymakers and the public on the direction of research. This story highlights the fact that many brilliant people working on synethic biology are motivated by values—just as citizens concerned about the technology are motivated by values in forming their opinions of the work. Indeed 30 percent of respondents in the survey said that a top concern was that “it is morally wrong to create artificial life.”

So if values is a shared language, then it makes sense to tell more stories about the concrete achievements and real efforts to ensure the safety of advances in the field. In this case, talking about values in story is a lot easier than talking about values in a hypothesis.

It’s very hard for me to have a conversation about these issues, because people adopt incredibly defensive postures…The scientists on one side and civil-society organizations on the other. And, to be fair to those groups, science has often proceeded by skipping the dialogue. But some environmental groups will say, Let’s not permit any of this work to get out of a laboratory until we are sure it is all safe. And as a practical matter that is not the way science works. We can’t come back decades later with an answer. We need to develop solutions by doing them. The potential is great enough, I believe, to convince people it’s worth the risk.

That’s Drew Endy, assistant professor of bioengineering at Stanford University, talking to Michael Specter in the current issue of The New Yorker about synthetic biology. This is more than just another example of great narrative science reporting from the magazine. It’s a showcase of candid, effective, values-based discussions about the social implications of an emerging technology.

Not only is Endy’s conscientious take on the promise and peril of synbio a perfect counter to anyone who claims that scientists don’t care about ethical boundaries; he also draws attention to a conversational impasse that prevents clear thinking on how to design useful regulatory policies.

Synbio is special among other emerging technologies like neuroscience and nanotechnology in that it already promises solutions to planet-scale problems in public health and energy. Specter opens the article with the story of how Jay Keasling at UC Berkeley built a breed of E. Coli bacteria that can manufacture artemisinin, a powerful treatment for drug-resistant malaria. Researchers are also hard at work designing organisms that can churn out biofuels at industrial scales. But the same open-source genetic components that build a life-saving bug could, in the wrong hands, build terrible pathogens.

As CAP Senior Fellow Andrew Light explained in a podcast on the ethics of emerging technologies, “The attitude is not to keep synbio from happening,” but rather to create and maintain public confidence in its benefits. Hearing clear, thoughtful messages from more scientists like Endy could go a long way to supporting that goal.

As Endy tells Specter, the reason many people recoil at the power to create synthetic life is “Because it’s scary as hell…It’s the coolest platform science has ever produced, but the questions it raises are the hardest to answer.”

To explore these ethical approaches to emerging technologies Science Progress spoke with Gregory E. Kaebnick, editor of the Hastings Center Report and principal investigator on the Center’s “Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology” project, and Andrew Light, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Because the field is advancing so rapidly, scientists, ethicists, and policymakers must address the social and ethical issues now, as it still matures, argue Kaenick’s colleagues, the authors of the new study. (To listen to the podcast of our conversation, see the audio player in the sidebar, download the mp3, or subscribe via iTunes.)

Synthetic biology, commonly referred to as “synbio,” is not one particular technology, but “more of an agenda” to use existing scientific tools to do rather than simply understand biological science, Kaebnick explained. Synbiologists “create and modify biological parts and organisms” using “a confluence of a variety of technologies” including DNA synthesis, information processing, and DNA sequencing, he said. The techniques can yield medicines, fuel, and industrial chemicals. Moreover, Light added that synbio shares many important concepts and jargon with information technology. Synthesizing DNA, for instance, is analogous in some ways to programming a machine to make it perform a specific task.

But what about the potential benefits promised by emerging technologies like synthetic biology and nanotech? One likely benefit, Light explained, may come from the intersection of nano and synbio energy research. Scientists in multiple U.S. labs are working to develop artificial photosynthesis, a process in which engineered cells turn water, sunlight, and carbon into biofuel. Light pointed to this as an important area of renewable energy research because it could help harness the 800 terawatts of solar energy striking the Earth at any given moment and transform it into useable resources. “This is at least one reason why I think we could see a big benefit if this technology develops in a responsible way,” he said.

Another important advance is in the artificial production of artemisinic acid, the precursor for artemisinin, an effective treatment for drug-resistant malaria. Kaebnick called it the “poster child for synbio,” as natural wormwood sources for the compound are expensive and rare.

Despite these potential benefits, synbio raises a number of concerns. One of the greatest risks is bioterrorism, Kaebnick said, as DNA synthesis techniques could be used to reproduce a variety of pathogens. For example, with the appropriate gene sequences, rogue scientists could recreate the polio virus or smallpox. They could even re-engineer smallpox so it is more deadly than the original disease, he explained.

Bioterrorism is a clear potential physical harm. In contrast, potential nonphysical harms present philosophical questions that range from “Are we over stepping our bounds as humans?” by engineering artificial life forms to “Who should have access to life-extending drugs?”

For example, Light suggested, if scientists develop a drug that radically extends the human lifespan, it may not be immediately accessible to the whole population although there would be “enormous pressure to invest in this technology,” he said.

A similar concern is creating whole organisms with synthetic DNA, Kaebnick said. Environmental preservation champions who believe “we ought to preserve biodiversity and rare organisms” even if it is “economically disadvantageous” to oppose such synbio research. He went on: “Down the road, we may have the ability to control our children’s development in utero,” using emerging technologies. Ethical issues in this area of synbio are similar to existing concerns raised by assisted reproductive technologies.

A number of regulations are already in place for synbio, Kaebnick said, as rules for biotechnology often spill over to technologies used in synbio. Regulations enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Agriculture, and other federal agencies may apply to emerging technologies as well, he explained. However, Light said there are still gaps left when considering synbio research, and due diligence will be necessary to prevent their exploitation. “The attitude is not to keep synbio from happening,” he said, but rather to create and maintain public confidence in its benefits.

Interview produced by Andrew Plemmons Pratt, managing editor for Science Progress, and Vivian Cheng, intern with Science Progress.