Anecdotal evidence, including several high-profile cases of scientists under criminal investigation, has led to the impression that many in the scientific community hold a negative view of law enforcement [1, 2, 3]. While justified in some cases, this divide is a serious liability to law enforcement, since cooperation and consultation with scientists aids in threat assessment, investigation, intelligence gathering, and the recruitment of personnel with specialized skills. But before the two communities can solve this problem with training for law enforcement personnel and through outreach to the scientific community, it is necessary to get a sense of the types and range of views of law enforcement within the scientific community.

Here we present the results of a survey of the scientific community conducted in conjunction with the FBI to evaluate the working relationship between FBI field agents and scientists. The survey was sent to 10,969 members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science between January 23 and February 18 of this year. 1,332 surveys were completed, and the resulting data produced an average margin of error associated with the total data set of +/- 2.7 percent. A complete version of the survey questions is available in the supplemental material (Table 1).

The attitudes of scientists toward law enforcement personnel are not vastly different from those of the general public (4) (Figure A, below). However, a larger percentage of scientists indicated cooler feelings towards the FBI than the general public, suggesting that these reservations are particular to the scientific community and require specific solutions with the scientific community in mind.

Figure A

The results show that scientists hold more favorable feelings towards state and local law enforcement than federal law enforcement. However, when confronted with specific issues or concerns, the responses reveal no significant distinction between interacting with the FBI or with law enforcement in general. Generally speaking, working in a specific scientific discipline has less effect on an individual’s view of law enforcement than demographic factors. Instead, trends suggested that male scientists and those over 50 years of age have a more positive attitude towards the FBI (Figure A, above). It should be noted that those scientists holding high or medium security clearances—and therefore arguably more likely to have firsthand contact with federal agents—had the highest level of warm views (47 percent) and the lowest level of cool views (23 percent) toward the FBI of any cohort covered in the survey. The survey also revealed that scientists are receptive to the idea of discussing their research with other scientists (93 percent), interested members of the public (87 percent), and journalists (72 percent), but are markedly unreceptive to sharing their work with law enforcement (federal 36 percent, state 34 percent, local 33 percent) (Figure B, below).

Figure B

Perhaps the most striking of the results is the indication that scientists are suspicious of the FBI and feel that they do not work well with the scientific community. Some scientists who had professional interactions with law enforcement reported that they had been questioned about the purpose of their international travel, asked to “spy” on their foreign colleagues, and in one case had a computer confiscated and searched. Specific concerns include the belief that law enforcement does not understand their work (76 percent), the belief that law enforcement is more interested in restricting research for security purposes than they are in the scientific value of the work (71 percent), that law enforcement has an overzealous approach to security issues and an interest in censorship (63 percent), and the fear that law enforcement will restrict the publication of some research (55 percent).

Figure C

Scientists expressed a clear preference to leave the monitoring of science to familiar authorities rather than law enforcement. Figure C illustrates that most scientists find it acceptable for a familiar authority such as an institutional biosafety committee (64 percent), institutional review board (63 percent), the head of the department (70 percent), or a government funding agency (60 percent) to play a role in monitoring research. In contrast, there is resistance to FBI (14 percent favorable), state law enforcement (13 percent favorable), local law enforcement (11 percent favorable), private security (11 percent favorable), or campus police (11 percent favorable) playing any role. Despite this reluctance to be monitored by law enforcement, scientists were not completely unwilling to interact with authorities in certain circumstances. The survey asked scientists to consider different circumstances where they might be asked to interact with the FBI and evaluate whether they felt the reasons for contact were good or bad (Figure D, below).

Figure D

(View a larger version of this figure.)

Almost all respondents (93 percent) felt that requesting technical expertise in a particular area of science was an excellent or good reason to be contacted, and 80 percent agreed that aiding in an ongoing criminal investigation was an excellent or good reason to work with law enforcement. However, the survey revealed that scientists are generally concerned that they would be asked to monitor the activities of a colleague, which 67 percent felt is not a legitimate reason to be contacted by the FBI. Understandably, scientists looked unfavorably on any role that law enforcement might have which interferes with research (57 percent); funding (52 percent); that invades privacy, such as reading personal emails (62 percent); or provides any role for law enforcement to interpret legitimate research as a potential public safety risk (61 percent).

Although some level of suspicion or distrust toward the FBI exists within the scientific community, it is interesting to note that only 15 percent of the surveyed scientists indicated any personal past contact with law enforcement agents in a professional capacity. The general view of these scientists towards the FBI was not significantly different from the views of scientists overall (Figure A, above), however they are more comfortable reporting suspicious activity to the authorities. Seventy-one percent of those who had previous interaction with law enforcement indicated that being contacted as a reference for a foreign student or researcher was a good or excellent reason, as opposed to 58 percent of those who had not. It is likely that this is a result of previous experience, since 30 percent of survey respondents reported that their past interaction with law enforcement was in regard to a visa or security clearance for themselves or a colleague. Nonetheless, the low percentage of scientists with previous law enforcement contact suggests that many of the attitudes of distrust are based upon stereotypes rather than actual experiences and that these perceptions have led to an elevated level of suspiciousness that law enforcement will have to overcome in the future. Together the results show that despite expressed suspicions of the FBI and opposition to law enforcement monitoring research, scientists are willing to aid law enforcement in certain situations. When asked in an open-ended context about what the FBI could do to improve relations with the scientific community, no single solution emerged (Figure E, below). A common suggestion from the respondents was to set up an appointment and approach the scientist in a professional manner. Respondents also stated that it would be beneficial for authorities to first contact the individual’s department head or supervisor and initiate contact through an institution’s official channels.

Figure E

By taking steps to address suspicions early in any interaction and by treating scientists respectfully and professionally, law enforcement representatives are more likely to build a foundation of respect with their interaction and displace existing hostility. Perhaps the single most important step would be to adopt simple procedures for an introductory phone call, email, or letter that clarifies the specific purpose for the meeting and details what the agent hopes to gain from the interaction. To ease the concerns expressed by scientists regarding their collaborators or their privacy, it is imperative that an agent establish clear boundaries about what they plan to do and plan not to do in any interaction. Being clear about the purpose of the meeting should alleviate suspicions and increase the likelihood of full cooperation.

Many scientists indicate that an understanding of science by an agent would ease their suspicions and therefore it may be helpful to increase the scientific literacy of law enforcement agents. Among researchers who felt that an official from law enforcement understood their work, 81 percent were receptive to helping in a criminal investigation, while only 63 percent of researchers who felt that a law enforcement official did not understand their work were receptive to helping. From this we conclude that scientists are most comfortable talking about their work to others that demonstrate familiarity with scientific concepts, possibly because they are less concerned that their work will be misunderstood.

Our survey shows that scientists share many of the common stereotypes held of law enforcement by the general public. More interestingly, it elucidates some issues that are specific to the science community, such as a general expressed reluctance to discuss research with law enforcement, despite an expressed willingness to share expertise to aid in criminal investigations. Increasing scientific literacy among law enforcement personnel who work with scientists may be one important avenue to ensure a strong relationship and clear communication between the law enforcement and science communities. The consequences of allowing discord between law enforcement and scientists to linger affect public safety as criminal, terrorist, and national security challenges become increasingly technical, and close collaboration with the scientific community becomes even more essential. We hope to apply the lessons learned in this survey towards improving the training and awareness of the law enforcement community in their interaction with scientists.

Nathaniel Hafer, Cheryl J. Vos, and Michael Stebbins are with the Federation of American Scientists; Karen McAllister and Gretchen Lorenzi are with the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Christopher Moore is with Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research; Kavita M. Berger is with the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Nathaniel Hafer and Cheryl J. Vos contributed equally to this work.

Michael Stebbins is the corresponding author, mstebbins@fas.org

References

1) D. Malakoff, Science. 297, 751-752 (2002).

2) M. Enserink, D. Malakoff, Science. 302, 2054-2063 (2003).

3) J. Couzin, Science. 305, 159 (2004).

4) NBC news/Wall Street Journal Survey, June 12, 2006.

Methods

The survey – The Federation of American Scientists, in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, developed a survey to gather baseline data on the prevailing points of view of scientists towards the law enforcement community. The survey contained a mix of multiple choice and open-ended questions. In collaboration with the American Association for the Advancement of Science the survey was distributed to 10,969 AAAS member scientists over a four-week period between January 23 and February 18, 2008. AAAS members were selected if they had a functional email address and had identified their primary field of study as biology, chemistry, physics, earth science, or engineering. Emails contained a link to a secure website where members could answer the survey questions. At the end of the time period 1,332 surveys were completed, and the resulting data were analyzed. The data were statistically weighted to be proportionally representative of the scientific disciplines of the AAAS membership. The margin of error associated with the total data set is +/- 2.7 percent.

Thermometer rating system – Two survey questions asked respondents to indicate their feelings towards a particular person, organization, or situation using a thermometer system. In this type of question, respondents give their response as any number between 0 and 100, with 100 being a very warm, favorable feeling, and 0 being a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold.

Table 1

Complete list of questions asked in the survey.

Question 1. Please indicate your feelings toward the following people and organizations with 100 meaning a VERY WARM, FAVORABLE feeling; 0 meaning a VERY COLD, UNFAVORABLE feeling; and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0 to 100, where the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that person or organization.

Local law enforcement Institutional Review Board (IRB)

State level law enforcement Campus police

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Head of your department

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Private grantmaking organizations

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government grantmaking organizations

Private security, such as those found at private research centers

Question 2. The following people and organizations might have some role in monitoring scientific research under certain circumstances. Please indicate your feelings about each one having some role in monitoring scientific research under certain circumstances, with 100 meaning a VERY WARM, FAVORABLE feeling; 0 meaning a VERY COLD, UNFAVORABLE feeling; and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0 to 100, where the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that person or organization having some role in monitoring scientific research under certain circumstances.

Local law enforcement Institutional Review Board (IRB)

State level law enforcement Campus police

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Head of your department

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Private grantmaking organizations

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government grantmaking organizations

Private security, such as those found at private research centers

Question 3. From time to time, individuals other than your immediate colleagues might be interested in the work you do. Please indicate how receptive you would be to sharing details of your work for each of the following:

Federal law enforcement agent State level politician

State law enforcement officer Federal level politician

Local law enforcement Private sector scientist

An official from a regulatory agency Public sector scientist

An agent from an intelligence agency Academic/non-profit scientist

Corporate executive in a related industry A journalist

Private citizen with an interest in science

Question 4. There are many reasons that an outside authority might want to talk to you in your role as a scientist. For each of the following, please indicate whether you believe it is an excellent, good, fair, or poor reason for an outside authority want to talk to you. 1 = Excellent, 2 = Good, 3 = Fair, 4 = Poor

Intellectual curiosity about your area of research

To evaluate a research grant you have applied for

To assess issues surrounding an intellectual property case

To be evaluated by an Institutional Review Board (IRB)

To have government regulators evaluate the research as a potential public safety risk

To have law enforcement evaluate the research as a potential public safety risk

To be shared with law enforcement to aid in an ongoing criminal investigation

To be shared with law enforcement to aid in an ongoing terrorism investigation

To be evaluated by an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)

To have law enforcement evaluate if the research is a potential target of theft of foreign intelligence agencies

Question 5. Now you are going to see some pairs of statements about working with (SPLIT A – Law enforcement officers, SPLIT B – FBI Agents) who sometimes need to talk with scientists in the course of their duties. After reading each pair of statements, please indicate whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own view, even if neither is exactly right. 1 = FIRST statement STRONGLY, 2 = FIRST statement NOT SO STRONGLY, 3 = SECOND statement NOT SO STRONGLY, 4 = SECOND statement STRONGLY I trust them OR I am suspicious of them

I believe that they are on my side OR I believe they are working against me

They understand my work OR They don’t understand my work

They work well with the science community OR They do not work well with the science community

They are primarily interested in the scientific value of my work OR They are primarily interested in restricting my work for security purposes

Scientists working closely with law enforcement agents is good for the scientific community OR Scientists working closely with law enforcement agents is bad for the scientific community

Some science needs to be kept under tight security and not released to the public for safety or security reasons OR All science should be made open to the public once it is ready for publication

More security equals more censorship OR More security does not equal more censorship

Question 6. There are many reasons that (SPLIT A – a law enforcement officer, SPLIT B- an FBI agent) might want to talk with a scientist. For each of the following, please indicate whether you believe it is an excellent, good, fair, or poor reason for (SPLIT A – a law enforcement officer, SPLIT B- an FBI agent) to approach a scientist. 1 = Excellent, 2 = Good, 3 = Fair, 4 = Poor

To clarify the nature of the scientist’s research

For the evaluation of the scientist’s research as a potential public health risk

To assess intellectual property rights issues related to the scientist’s research

To aid in an ongoing criminal investigation

To aid in an ongoing terrorism investigation

To request technical expertise in a particular area of science or technology

To interview the scientist because they are listed as the sponsor of a foreign student or researcher

To evaluate if a scientist’s work has possible alternate applications that might constitute a security risk, sometimes called “dual-use” research

To help safeguard it from theft by potential terrorists

To inquire about the activities of one of your colleagues that is an American citizen

To inquire about the activities of one of your colleagues that is not an American citizen

For the evaluation of the scientist’s research as a potential national security risk

Question 7. Suppose you received a message that a (SPLIT A- Law enforcement officer, SPLIT B- FBI agent) wanted to speak with you in your capacity as a scientist. For many people, this might raise some concerns about why the (LE officer/Agent) would want to contact them. Please indicate how concerned would you be that the (LE officer/Agent) would… 1 = Very concerned, 2 = Somewhat concerned, 3 = Not too concerned, 4 = Not at all concerned.

Read your personal emails

Ask you to monitor the activities of one of your colleagues

Investigate immigration issues related to you or one of your colleagues

Interfere with you conducting your research

Misinterpret your research as a potential public safety risk

Misinterpret your international travel as evidence of illegal activities

Stop you from publishing your research

Interfere with your research funding

Embarrass you in the eyes of your colleagues

Question 8. If you saw something suspicious happening in your workplace that made you concerned about a potential threat to public safety, who would you feel comfortable reporting to?

Your department head A federal law enforcement officer

Your immediate supervisor A local law enforcement officer

An institutional safety committee A state law enforcement officer

Public safety/security officer affiliated with your institution

An institutional review board

Other (Specify)

Question 9. Have you or any of your colleagues ever been approached by (SPLIT A – a member of law enforcement, SPLIT B – an FBI agent) to discuss something related to your work as a scientist? If yes, Please describe the circumstances under which you were approached by (SPLIT A – a member of law enforcement, SPLIT B – an FBI agent) to discuss something related to your work as a scientist.

Question 10. What is the best way for (SPLIT A – Law enforcement officers, SPLIT B – FBI Agents) to contact a scientist?

Question 11. What could (SPLIT A – a member of law enforcement, SPLIT B – an FBI agent) do to improve relations with the scientific community?

Question 12. What could scientists do to improve relations with the (SPLIT A – law enforcement community, SPLIT B – the FBI )?

Question 13. What is your gender?

Male Female

Question 14. In what year were you born?

Question 15. Which of the following best describes the current stage of your career?

Undergraduate Laboratory technician

Graduate student Academic staff scientist

Post doctorate Lab manager

Primary investigator Retired

Industry scientist

Question 16. Please indicate how often you work with foreign nationals in you capacity as a scientist.

Often Never

Sometimes I am a foreign national

Rarely

Question 17. Please indicate the highest biosafety level (BSL) work environment you have worked in.

BSL1 BSL4

BSL2 I have never worked in a facility with biosafety levels

BSL3 I don’t know

Question 18. Please indicate which of the following materials you work with in your capacity as a scientist:

Animals Explosive, corrosive, or otherwise toxic chemicals

Viruses Radioactive isotopes

Bacteria Select agents

Fungi Nuclear material

Human subjects None of the above

Question 19. Please mark the category that best describes the sector you are employed in as a scientist.

Academic Military

Government, but not military Private sector

Question 20. Please indicate the level of security in your current workplace.

High (Military level security)

Medium (Secure facility, picture ID required for access, armed guards)

Low (Restricted access to facility, some security personnel presence)

Minimal (Basic locks on doors, no restricted access to facility)

AP/Petr David Josek

A U.S. soldier from the 3rd Brigade combat team, 101st Airborne Division, adjusts his colleague’s helmet. New research may lead to headgear that better protects against traumatic brain injuries.

According to Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, from 10 to 20 percent of Iraq war vets, or between 150,000 and 300,000 soldiers, have suffered a traumatic brain injury. TBI does not necessarily leave a visible wound; rather, the force of an explosion can bruise the brain, causing a variety of symptoms than may be difficult to distinguish from other psychological injuries prevalent in combat zones. Developing better ways to diagnose and treat TBI is important, but preventing it in the first place would be even better.

Recent research from scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory investigates the mechanics of how blasts affect the brain and may provide an answer. Traditionally, armor design, including helmets, focused on minimizing the force of impacts–either from objects striking the soldier or from the soldier being thrown against hard surfaces. But the new study investigates how shock waves from explosions can flex and deform the skull itself, creating internal pressure on the soft brain tissue. Some current helmet designs that maintain a gap between the skull and the helmet wall actually amplify the pressure from blast waves. The research could lead to improved helmet design that protects from projectiles, impacts, and blast waves.

The abstract from “Skull Flexure from Blast Waves: A New Mechanism for Brain Injury with Implications for Helmet Design”:

Traumatic brain injury [TBI] has become the signature injury of current military conflicts. The debilitating effects of TBI on society are long-lasting and costly. Although the mechanisms by which impacts cause TBI have been well researched, the mechanisms by which blasts cause TBI are not understood. Various mechanisms, including impacts caused by the blast, have been investigated, but blast-induced deformation of the skull has been neglected. Through the use of hydrodynamical numerical simulations, we have discovered that non-lethal blasts can induce sufficient flexure of the skull to generate potentially damaging loads in the brain, even if no impact occurs. This mechanism has implications for the diagnosis of TBI in soldiers and the design of protective equipment such as helmets.

(Hat tip: VSL: Science)

It’s been a marathon year for media coverage of athletic doping. Everybody, it seems, is upset about the ever-growing use of interventions to build muscle mass, quicken reaction times, and boost oxygen levels in the body. So much chatter! It’s like steroids on steroids.

Suddenly, the idea of winning the enemy’s hearts and minds becomes weirdly biochemical.

But let me draw your attention to a new event in the Handwringing Olympics, described in a remarkable report released this week by the National Research Council. It focuses in part on the flip side of the enhancement market, namely the military and intelligence communities’ interest in drugs and other methods for degrading performance—of enemy soldiers and terrorists, of course—and perhaps reading their intentions and even controlling their minds. Cognitive war is hell, sure, but at least it’s all in your head.

And you thought a shot of growth hormone in a baseball player’s butt was the biggest doping crisis facing the nation.

The 151-page NRC report was commissioned by the Defense Intelligence Agency. It was released with spy-like discretion on Wednesday (no press conference or major media blast), bearing a title too bland to be bland by accident: “Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and Related Technologies.” (Inexplicably, the folks running the National Academies web site blew the report’s undercover cover, giving it the somewhat more telling online title “Cognitive Neuroscience Research and National Security”)

The report argues that the U.S. intelligence community must do a better job of keeping up with advances in the neurosciences. It’s not for nothing, it notes, that the brain is associated with intelligence. And echoing today’s Beijing blogosphere, it focuses a fair amount on enhancement, noting that there is a large and quickly growing market in drugs and other products that can boost physical strength and cognitive performance, which can benefit not just bicyclists and weightlifters but also U.S. forces in battle.

“In the future,” the report notes, “as soldiers prepare for conflict, [the Department of Defense] may call on the neurophysiology community to assist in maintaining the warfighting superiority of the United States. Commanders will ask how they can make their troops learn faster. How can they increase the speed with which their soldiers process large amounts of information quickly and accurately? How can the neurosciences help soldiers to make the correct decision in the difficult environment of wartime operations?”

Let’s ignore for now how this message contradicts what is perhaps the biggest antidoping argument tossed around by Olympic commentators, namely that a focus on enhancement “sends the wrong message” about drugs to our nation’s kids. Suffice it to say that the link between warfare and sports runs deep, and it is hard to imagine a society that honors enhancement on the battlefield but truly shuns it in the sports arena.

But even more interesting to me is the report’s discussion of the emerging market in brain-targeted, performance-degrading techniques. Some experiments, it turns out, suggest that magnetic beams can be used to induce seizures in people, a tempting addition to the military’s armamentarium. More conventionally, as scientists discover new chemicals that can blur thinking or undermine an enemy’s willpower, and as engineers design aerosolized delivery systems that can deliver these chemicals directly to the lungs (and from there, the brains) of large groups of people, the prospect of influencing the behavior of entire enemy regiments becomes real.

Indeed, in a crude way, that is exactly what Russian troops did in 2002 during the Moscow theater crisis, when they incapacitated rebels with a narcotic gas, fentanyl. But in a perfect war, the attack would be more subtle and perhaps even covert.

“Although conflict has many aspects, one that warfighters and policy makers often talk about is the motivation to fight, which undoubtedly has its origins in the brain and is reflected in peripheral neurophysiological processes,” the NRC report notes. “So one question would be, ‘How can we disrupt the enemy’s motivation to fight?’ Other questions raised by controlling the mind: ‘How can we make people trust us more?’ ‘What if we could help the brain to remove fear or pain?’ ‘Is there a way to make the enemy obey our commands?’…As cognitive neuroscience and related technologies become more pervasive, using technology for nefarious purposes becomes easier.”

Suddenly, the idea of winning the enemy’s hearts and minds becomes weirdly biochemical.

The report acknowledges that this approach to dealing with international squabbles is likely to stir some controversy.

“The brain is viewed as the organ most associated with personal identity,” it says, so “there is sure to be enormous societal interest in any prospective manipulation of neural processes.”

But cognitive warfare is potentially “more humane” than old-fashioned warfare—“pills instead of bullets,” in the report’s words—making this a likely growth industry, the NRC concludes. And if nothing else, it suggests, the United States should be a leader in the field so that if our enemies develop such weapons then American soldiers can have the best defenses available.

“The fear that this approach to fighting war might be developed will be justification for developing countermeasures to possible cognitive weapons. This escalation might lead to innovations that could cause this market area to expand rapidly. Tests would need to be developed to determine if a soldier had been harmed by a cognitive weapon. And there would be a need for a prophylactic of some sort.”

Moreover, the report says, with perhaps a subliminal nod to Abu Ghraib, “The concept of torture could also be altered by products in this market. It is possible that someday there could be a technique developed to extract information from a prisoner that does not have any lasting side effects.”

This is important not only because photos of hooded prisoners with wires attached to them are embarrassing, but also because, as noted in the report, one of the real drivers of torture today is scientists’ ongoing failure to develop reliable means of determining whether someone is lying or telling the truth. Of course, neuroscience can cut both ways, helping torturers extract information but also helping captives resist. In what the NRC report acknowledges may be a “far-fetched” but not necessarily crazy example, one can imagine soldiers getting Botox injections before a mission to prevent their facial expressions from giving away information if they get captured and interrogated.

Botox. The ultimate in cosmetic counterterrorist tactics.

The NRC is probably correct that these and similar avenues of scientific inquiry deserve better monitoring than is now underway in the secretive hallways of American intelligence agencies. No nation wants to get caught by surprise by a fancy new cognitive weapon that makes its soldiers suddenly willing to settle for a bronze medal in World War III.

But where and when will the discussions of human rights, privacy, and sovereignty come in? How do these nascent technologies fit into existing international conventions on warfare, on the treatment of prisoners, on civil and political rights and on medical experimentation and informed consent? Surely Congress deserves to know what methods are to be used when it makes the precipitous decision to go to war.

Perhaps Olympic doping is a big problem. Perhaps it is right that so much attention is being paid to athletes and their coaches who are tinkering with the limits of human capacity. Me, I am much more worried about the Big Boys with their brainy neurological toys. It’s bad when players break the rules, but games that have none are scarier.

Rick Weiss is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Science Progress.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the number of ID checks in American life has climbed sharply. Some advocate more intrusive identification systems to fight terrorism and limit immigration, while others are skeptical of new procedures for verifying identity because of the impact they may have on costs, computer security, privacy, and civil liberties. The growing “ID Divide” presents significant policy question as technological advances outpace the government’s ability to protect its citizens.

Bruce Schneier, a leading security technologist, addresses these technical limitations. According to Schneier, the databases connected to identification cards are the source of the problem, not the cards themselves, as no ID can be more secure than the procedures used to operate the underlying database. Even individuals authorized to access these systems have queried the databases for unauthorized purposes, so we know that the threats to individual personal information are significant. Schneier also suggests that IDs cannot distinguish “evildoers” from other citizens; therefore, we must find ways to close security gaps and simultaneously protect individual privacy.

Video transcript.

To better understand the relationship between scientific research and national defense, Science Progress spoke with security technologist and author Bruce Schneier about why secrecy makes for bad policy in science and engineering, and whether or not a new institutionalized science-security dialogue would be helpful or simply theatrical.

Jonathan Pfeiffer, Science Progress: The National Research Council is concerned that the federal government has categorized too many scientific research results after 9/11 as “sensitive but unclassified.” Can you explain what this term means and why this is a problem?

Bruce Schneier: It’s kind of a weasel term in the U.S. government and military. There are classified military information and government secrets, and there are levels of classification: confidential, secret, top secret, and code words above that. And there are special rules for dealing with that information. “Sensitive but unclassified” is a halfway house between public information and classified information. It’s not really a secret, but someone somewhere doesn’t want someone else to know, so it becomes a gray area. The rules are a lot sloppier, there’s a lot more leeway, and more and more–not only in science, but everywhere–information that used to be given to the public as a matter of course becomes “sensitive but unclassified.” It could be phone directories; it could be hours of operation for buildings; it could be locations of polling places. And a lot of scientific data, information, and knowledge–stuff that is used by the scientific community, used by businesses, used by everybody–gets stuck in this halfway house between secret and open. It’s a form of secrecy, and it’s a form of stifling information sharing. And where it affects scientists is that science thrives on information sharing. Science works because one person’s research becomes another person’s footnotes.

SP: You wrote in Beyond Fear that secrecy in science and engineering “stifles the cycle of innovation and invention that fuels the economic engine of the world’s open societies.”

Schneier: My research becomes data you use for your research. It becomes data someone else uses for their technology. It becomes stuff someone else uses for their products. And all of these feed on each other. Our society and our technology are great because of that openness. Whatever scientists and researchers do becomes fodder for this engine of more research. And when you start cutting off branches–when you start saying, “No, that’s too sensitive. Don’t make it public”– you’re stifling research, because now no one else can use that research. Then we can’t benefit from that research, and the benefits are often hidden. We don’t know which piece of research will fuel the next big advance in computers, medical devices, or transportation. So you can’t just say, “That doesn’t have application in anything except bad things, so we can make it secret.” We don’t know that.

There’s a conceit here. The counter-argument is going to be: “If we make this research into explosives public, the bad guys will find out about it.” But that’s true for everything in our society. Everything we do can be used by the good guys and the bad guys. We use cars to get around; bank robbers use cars to drive away. We use telephones; the mafia uses telephones. The reason society works is that the good uses outweigh the bad uses. Sure, you can ban telephones. Sure, you can ban automobiles. Sure, you can ban scientific research. But it doesn’t help, because the benefits of doing these things–of having these technologies, of making them open and available–greatly outweigh the disadvantages. That’s what we’re losing sight of. We’re trying to contain certain types of research because of near-term fears, but then we lose all the long-term benefits.

SP: The NRC is now recommending the full implementation of NSDD-189, Ronald Reagan’s 1985 order to keep unclassified research results open and available to the maximum possible extent. Do you have any concerns about referring, in the world of post 9/11 policymaking, to Cold War-era policies?

Schneier: Well, the devil is in the details. That is a good document if it really does say that we should make research open and available. I don’t care when it was written, if it was written twenty years, thirty years, or fifty years ago. So no, I have no concern about that. We have to read the details to make sure there are no hidden gotchas, but in general, I have no concern.

SP: Do you think we now face science and security issues that policymakers in 1985 were not able to anticipate?

Schneier: I think not. I think the rhetoric that 9/11 changed everything is overrated. The issues of science and openness are just as important now as they were then. The threats and the risks are just as big–and as small–now as they were then. The same philosophy of openness that has served our country for over two hundred years should still be in effect. So, no, I don’t see any change in worldview that would make us have to reassess scientific openness policies from twenty or thirty years ago.

SP: Some scholars of global and international studies will say that the world is a different place now, though perhaps outside the issue of security. Are you concentrating only on security when you say there should be no change in worldview?

Schneier: The world is a different place. There’s a lot more globalization. One of the things that is unanticipated is how much of the research has now moved outside the U.S.: because of secrecy concerns, because of weird laws prohibiting certain kinds of research, or because of problems with visas. A lot of really good research is now being done in Europe, Asia, Australia, and the Middle East. So these policies are hurting us in ways that will take us decades to recover, because we’re losing the scientific advantage our country had.

SP: You have argued before that the value of secrecy should be judged on a case-by-case basis. However, the federal government also needs broad principles and guidelines for regulating scientific publishing. What can the government do?

Schneier: The first principle is that openness should be assumed, and that we should strive for openness wherever possible. There are areas of research that are wholly military, like minefield detection, military missile technology, or nuclear weapons technology. And it makes sense that parts of that research should be classified and should be kept secret. The stuff on the edges, like research into nuclear power, which has both commercial and military applications, should be judged on a case-by-case basis with the bias toward making things open. So it’s only a big problem if you try to classify broad swaths of research. But if you realize that the things that should be kept secret are actually very narrow, then it becomes a much easier problem.

SP: People often assume that the security and science communities are divided by their goals: It is supposed that the science community generally wants everything to be open so that collaboration can flourish, and that the security community is keen to restrict publishing and even to restrict actual research when it could make terror more effective. Is this a valid assumption?

Schneier: Yeah, that’s probably true. Most security people have a fetish for secrecy. It’s a belief that secrecy will make them safer. It’s nonsense. It makes no sense. It’s not the way to play the game. You will find that those in security, especially in national security, want to make everything secret, in the thought that it will make us safer. And science is about openness; science is all about publishing. If you do the research and you don’t publish, you might as well not bother to do the research. You haven’t increased the wealth of human knowledge if you don’t publish.

SP: How effective and constructive right now is the dialogue between the science and security communities?

Schneier: The dialogue is pretty terrible. Right now, especially in politics, security is winning. Whether it’s right or wrong, whether it makes sense or not, security wins. We’re living in a world where common sense, where balanced reasoning, where doing what’s right tends not to win over fear, over paranoia, over security. The dialogue is terrible.

SP: The NRC is exploring ways to institutionalize the dialogue, so that persons with proper security clearances can get together to discuss sensitive issues in scientific research. You argued in Beyond Fear that institutions and bureaucracies often want to appear to be doing good things for security. Is this a problem for the institutionalization of the science-security dialogue?

Schneier: “Security theater” is what I define as security that doesn’t do anything but looks good. A lot of airport security is a great example: It doesn’t actually make us safer, but it looks like we’re doing something. The fear is that when policymakers try to do things in security, they have a predilection toward security theater, because it makes them look like they’re doing something to the public, to their constituents, to whomever. So there is a natural draw toward security theater–toward security measures that make a big press splash because they look good.

The fear is that in a dialogue between scientists and the security community, both sides will be drawn toward security theater. I don’t think that’s much of a risk, or if it is, the value of the dialogue is much greater. Remember: The scientists have a different agenda. Their agenda is amassing human knowledge for progress and openness. So they will have a predilection toward openness, and not a predilection toward secrecy. So they’re going to look at security theater in the same way I do as a researcher: with derision, rather than as a way of reassuring the public that something is being done, even though it might not be effective. So I don’t think there is a big risk, and if there is, the value of an institutionalized dialogue here, I think, is enormous.

The 9/11 attacks ignited fears that terrorists could enroll in U.S. universities and use the scientific and technical knowledge they acquire to attack economic, political, and cultural targets in the United States. Policymakers responded with new regulations, such as restrictions on student visas. The NRC, a private institution that focuses on government science, technology, and health policy advice, subsequently became concerned that such policy responses to 9/11 were actually a perverse liability, rather than an asset, to U.S. security and competitiveness. The new report reflects an attempt to revise these policies.

Jacques Gansler, Vice President for Research at the University of Maryland, argued during his presentation that many trade, export, and science policies in the United States currently fail to reflect the realities of a globalized world. U.S. leadership depends on global collaboration, he said. He lamented the fact that the United States is no longer the world leader in the field of quantum computing–an increasingly vital instrument for both security and competitiveness–and he described the irony that policies which purported to strengthen security actually caused the dulling of the U.S. competitive edge in quantum computing.

Drawing attention to the culture of fear which he said has largely dominated U.S. security discourse after 9/11, Gansler also described a failed Pentagon proposal to require researchers in universities to wear badges identifying them as U.S. nationals or non-nationals. “We tried that sort of thing with the Star of David, and it didn’t work,” he quipped. Finally, Gansler called for full implementation of NSDD-189, a directive introduced by Ronald Reagan (and subsequently endorsed by Condoleezza Rice). NSDD-189 requires results of scientific research to “remain unrestricted” to the maximum possible extent.

Alice Gast, President of Lehigh University, explained the report’s policy recommendations in further detail. Most important, she said, is a recommendation to create a new, high-level Science and Security Commission to be co-chaired by the National Security Adviser and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Gast explained that successful dialogues between scientists and security experts have occurred in the past, but they have been too “reactive.” Institutionalizing the dialogue between the security and science communities, she said, would enable the federal government to efficiently organize a team of science-security policy advisers with security clearances necessary for discussing sensitive issues.

The report also expresses concern about the categorization of some scientific information as “sensitive but unclassified.” According to the NRC, widespread use of this category betrays the spirit of openness and collaboration articulated in NSDD-189, and requires researchers to spend time worrying about which of their research results can and cannot be published. Gerald Epstein, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reminded the audience that some security risks must be accepted, especially if they are necessary to foster technical innovation.

Some experts have suggested that resources might be better utilized by improving existing detection methods within traditional health care settings, such as hospitals. This would involve developing better diagnostic tools and data sharing systems so that information from hospitals could be centrally gathered and analyzed. The Washington Post reports that $2 million of BioWatch’s $77 million operating budget has been allocated to a National Academy of Sciences study to determine if investing in new sensor technology—such as that deployed in New York—is the best way to combat the bioterror threat.

Another concern is that the push to deploy new sensors has overshadowed the role of the public in the response to an airborne attack. An article in the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science last year highlighted the role of community planning and involvement in responding to health disasters that tax the official emergency infrastructure. Its authors conclude that community engagement before an attack is essential to lay the groundwork for appropriate communication and action when responding to an emergency. This type of coordination amidst a disaster appears unlikely given the findings of a report in June from the Center for a New American Security. That report suggests that officials would be unable to meet the public’s demand for immediate instructions, rapid diagnosis, and the dissemination of medications and vaccines in the event of an attack.

The challenge today is to determine the best balance between investing in new technology, augmenting existing infrastructure, and educating the public about the threat of bioterrorism and how to respond to it. Complicating the matter is the necessity to ensure that any outreach is done in such a way as to constructively inform the public without creating excessive alarm.

Image: Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS) monitor, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory