Map: Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza

Explore WHO data on human avian influenza infections in the countries where they have been reported since 2003.

The media have moved on from the avian influenza scare. Editors got bored when, after bird flu first jumped to humans a few years ago, a feared global pandemic did not swallow humanity. But the risk has not diminished. Indeed, scientists agree that it is inevitable that the avian influenza virus will at some point gain the lucky mutation or two that will allow it to spread not just from chickens to people but also quickly and easily from person to person. Such a strain could quickly kill two million Americans and incapacitate tens of millions more, according to government estimates. The global toll would be orders of magnitude higher, wreaking economic and social havoc and perhaps political instability.

A meeting in Washington last week sponsored by the Infectious Diseases Society of America offered a sobering update of what the disease is up to and the level of preparedness here at home and around the world. The facts are scary. But a lot more is known today than in 1918-1919, when the last massive flu pandemic swept around the globe, sickening one-third of all humanity and killing 50 to 100 million people. And it is inspiring to see how much scientific and logistical work is underway to help humanity survive the next pandemic relatively intact.

To speak of humanity being at risk may sound overly dire considering that the so-called H5N1 avian flu is still almost entirely a disease of birds. But the virulent virus is clearly developing an appetite for people. Since 2003, there have been 404 confirmed human cases of avian flu in 15 countries, most of them in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Egypt but with a recent serious uptick in China, which has reported seven cases and four deaths already this year.

Any single case could become the epicenter of a global epidemic in the event of a lucky mutation. And trust me, you don’t want to get infected with this bug. Two out of three people who fall ill from it die. “The potential to kill so many so quickly makes this the number one infectious threat” worldwide, said Keiji Fukuda, coordinator of the World Health Organization’s Global Influenza Program.

The good news is that the global stockpile of antiviral medicines, which will hopefully be at least somewhat effective against pandemic flu, is growing every year. Also growing is the world’s capacity to produce and stockpile large amounts of vaccine, including the 150 million doses that WHO is committed to distributing to low- and middle-income countries if needed.

But let’s not lose perspective on what this “good news” means. We’re talking here about a goal of being able to vaccinate perhaps two percent of the population of these countries—mostly healthcare workers and essential emergency and government personnel. And that is assuming that global distribution goes well. WHO is still considering which countries should serve as storage and distribution hubs, with one consideration being the likelihood that a given government might just grab what’s there for itself in a pinch. “It’s obviously a very political” issue, said Douglas Holtzman of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which is bankrolling a lot of the nuts–and-bolts planning for a global pandemic response.

Speaking of every man for himself, how are we doing in this country? Until recently Congress has generally been good about keeping the money flowing for federal pandemic preparedness. The nation is on track to accumulate enough vaccine to inoculate every American within 6 months of the first signs of an outbreak, for example. Shortsightedly, however, Senate negotiators last week agreed to remove a crucial $870 million allocation for further preparations to be coordinated by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority. (A look at what BARDA is up to says a lot about the government’s entirely appropriate worries in anticipation of flu-based “mass casualties.” In addition to speeding the commercialization of emergency medicines and vaccines, for example, there is an effort to mass-produce ventilators for rapid deployment to the countless Americans who would die from pandemic flu without respiratory assistance.) That money needs to be reinserted in conference with the House.

Equally worrisome, pandemic preparedness funding for states and localities—those crucial first responders—has been cut by 25 percent since 2005. It’s crucial that this funding be restored in the 2010 budget, said Jeffrey Levi, a public health policy specialist at George Washington University and executive director of Trust for America’s Health. Levi also worries about the longstanding expectation that private companies will purchase drug stockpiles for their employees. “In a recession this is the first thing to go,” Levi said.

In general, the U.S. preparedness plan needs a thorough freshening up to reflect current scientific and political realities and to highlight unmet priorities. Among them: Hospitals still have virtually no “surge capacity”—the ability to absorb added patients in the event of a pandemic. And only a few states (notably New York and California) have done the tough work of mapping out pandemic rules for hospitals and healthcare workers. Those rules reflect the cold realities of a pandemic, including orders to take older patients off their life-saving ventilators if younger flu victims show up and are deemed to have better odds of long-term survival with the help of that equipment.

Vaccine and drug makers are cranking hard, and should be applauded for their commitments to help prepare the nation for a pandemic. But check out what is behind them: Big federal grants for research and development, and government commitments to pay for about half the cost of new production facilities, which the companies can use to make other profitable pharmaceuticals during non-emergency years.

In short, no entity other than the federal government is going to make sure we are prepared for a pandemic (or bioterror or dirty bomb attacks, requiring similar preparations). There is no better example of your tax dollars at work. So if the sheer embarrassment of recent nomination withdrawals isn’t incentive enough, think about all that is being done on your behalf as you consider cutting corners on your Form 1040 this year.

Rick Weiss is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Science Progress.

Anecdotal evidence, including several high-profile cases of scientists under criminal investigation, has led to the impression that many in the scientific community hold a negative view of law enforcement [1, 2, 3]. While justified in some cases, this divide is a serious liability to law enforcement, since cooperation and consultation with scientists aids in threat assessment, investigation, intelligence gathering, and the recruitment of personnel with specialized skills. But before the two communities can solve this problem with training for law enforcement personnel and through outreach to the scientific community, it is necessary to get a sense of the types and range of views of law enforcement within the scientific community.

Here we present the results of a survey of the scientific community conducted in conjunction with the FBI to evaluate the working relationship between FBI field agents and scientists. The survey was sent to 10,969 members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science between January 23 and February 18 of this year. 1,332 surveys were completed, and the resulting data produced an average margin of error associated with the total data set of +/- 2.7 percent. A complete version of the survey questions is available in the supplemental material (Table 1).

The attitudes of scientists toward law enforcement personnel are not vastly different from those of the general public (4) (Figure A, below). However, a larger percentage of scientists indicated cooler feelings towards the FBI than the general public, suggesting that these reservations are particular to the scientific community and require specific solutions with the scientific community in mind.

Figure A

The results show that scientists hold more favorable feelings towards state and local law enforcement than federal law enforcement. However, when confronted with specific issues or concerns, the responses reveal no significant distinction between interacting with the FBI or with law enforcement in general. Generally speaking, working in a specific scientific discipline has less effect on an individual’s view of law enforcement than demographic factors. Instead, trends suggested that male scientists and those over 50 years of age have a more positive attitude towards the FBI (Figure A, above). It should be noted that those scientists holding high or medium security clearances—and therefore arguably more likely to have firsthand contact with federal agents—had the highest level of warm views (47 percent) and the lowest level of cool views (23 percent) toward the FBI of any cohort covered in the survey. The survey also revealed that scientists are receptive to the idea of discussing their research with other scientists (93 percent), interested members of the public (87 percent), and journalists (72 percent), but are markedly unreceptive to sharing their work with law enforcement (federal 36 percent, state 34 percent, local 33 percent) (Figure B, below).

Figure B

Perhaps the most striking of the results is the indication that scientists are suspicious of the FBI and feel that they do not work well with the scientific community. Some scientists who had professional interactions with law enforcement reported that they had been questioned about the purpose of their international travel, asked to “spy” on their foreign colleagues, and in one case had a computer confiscated and searched. Specific concerns include the belief that law enforcement does not understand their work (76 percent), the belief that law enforcement is more interested in restricting research for security purposes than they are in the scientific value of the work (71 percent), that law enforcement has an overzealous approach to security issues and an interest in censorship (63 percent), and the fear that law enforcement will restrict the publication of some research (55 percent).

Figure C

Scientists expressed a clear preference to leave the monitoring of science to familiar authorities rather than law enforcement. Figure C illustrates that most scientists find it acceptable for a familiar authority such as an institutional biosafety committee (64 percent), institutional review board (63 percent), the head of the department (70 percent), or a government funding agency (60 percent) to play a role in monitoring research. In contrast, there is resistance to FBI (14 percent favorable), state law enforcement (13 percent favorable), local law enforcement (11 percent favorable), private security (11 percent favorable), or campus police (11 percent favorable) playing any role. Despite this reluctance to be monitored by law enforcement, scientists were not completely unwilling to interact with authorities in certain circumstances. The survey asked scientists to consider different circumstances where they might be asked to interact with the FBI and evaluate whether they felt the reasons for contact were good or bad (Figure D, below).

Figure D

(View a larger version of this figure.)

Almost all respondents (93 percent) felt that requesting technical expertise in a particular area of science was an excellent or good reason to be contacted, and 80 percent agreed that aiding in an ongoing criminal investigation was an excellent or good reason to work with law enforcement. However, the survey revealed that scientists are generally concerned that they would be asked to monitor the activities of a colleague, which 67 percent felt is not a legitimate reason to be contacted by the FBI. Understandably, scientists looked unfavorably on any role that law enforcement might have which interferes with research (57 percent); funding (52 percent); that invades privacy, such as reading personal emails (62 percent); or provides any role for law enforcement to interpret legitimate research as a potential public safety risk (61 percent).

Although some level of suspicion or distrust toward the FBI exists within the scientific community, it is interesting to note that only 15 percent of the surveyed scientists indicated any personal past contact with law enforcement agents in a professional capacity. The general view of these scientists towards the FBI was not significantly different from the views of scientists overall (Figure A, above), however they are more comfortable reporting suspicious activity to the authorities. Seventy-one percent of those who had previous interaction with law enforcement indicated that being contacted as a reference for a foreign student or researcher was a good or excellent reason, as opposed to 58 percent of those who had not. It is likely that this is a result of previous experience, since 30 percent of survey respondents reported that their past interaction with law enforcement was in regard to a visa or security clearance for themselves or a colleague. Nonetheless, the low percentage of scientists with previous law enforcement contact suggests that many of the attitudes of distrust are based upon stereotypes rather than actual experiences and that these perceptions have led to an elevated level of suspiciousness that law enforcement will have to overcome in the future. Together the results show that despite expressed suspicions of the FBI and opposition to law enforcement monitoring research, scientists are willing to aid law enforcement in certain situations. When asked in an open-ended context about what the FBI could do to improve relations with the scientific community, no single solution emerged (Figure E, below). A common suggestion from the respondents was to set up an appointment and approach the scientist in a professional manner. Respondents also stated that it would be beneficial for authorities to first contact the individual’s department head or supervisor and initiate contact through an institution’s official channels.

Figure E

By taking steps to address suspicions early in any interaction and by treating scientists respectfully and professionally, law enforcement representatives are more likely to build a foundation of respect with their interaction and displace existing hostility. Perhaps the single most important step would be to adopt simple procedures for an introductory phone call, email, or letter that clarifies the specific purpose for the meeting and details what the agent hopes to gain from the interaction. To ease the concerns expressed by scientists regarding their collaborators or their privacy, it is imperative that an agent establish clear boundaries about what they plan to do and plan not to do in any interaction. Being clear about the purpose of the meeting should alleviate suspicions and increase the likelihood of full cooperation.

Many scientists indicate that an understanding of science by an agent would ease their suspicions and therefore it may be helpful to increase the scientific literacy of law enforcement agents. Among researchers who felt that an official from law enforcement understood their work, 81 percent were receptive to helping in a criminal investigation, while only 63 percent of researchers who felt that a law enforcement official did not understand their work were receptive to helping. From this we conclude that scientists are most comfortable talking about their work to others that demonstrate familiarity with scientific concepts, possibly because they are less concerned that their work will be misunderstood.

Our survey shows that scientists share many of the common stereotypes held of law enforcement by the general public. More interestingly, it elucidates some issues that are specific to the science community, such as a general expressed reluctance to discuss research with law enforcement, despite an expressed willingness to share expertise to aid in criminal investigations. Increasing scientific literacy among law enforcement personnel who work with scientists may be one important avenue to ensure a strong relationship and clear communication between the law enforcement and science communities. The consequences of allowing discord between law enforcement and scientists to linger affect public safety as criminal, terrorist, and national security challenges become increasingly technical, and close collaboration with the scientific community becomes even more essential. We hope to apply the lessons learned in this survey towards improving the training and awareness of the law enforcement community in their interaction with scientists.

Nathaniel Hafer, Cheryl J. Vos, and Michael Stebbins are with the Federation of American Scientists; Karen McAllister and Gretchen Lorenzi are with the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Christopher Moore is with Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research; Kavita M. Berger is with the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Nathaniel Hafer and Cheryl J. Vos contributed equally to this work.

Michael Stebbins is the corresponding author, mstebbins@fas.org

References

1) D. Malakoff, Science. 297, 751-752 (2002).

2) M. Enserink, D. Malakoff, Science. 302, 2054-2063 (2003).

3) J. Couzin, Science. 305, 159 (2004).

4) NBC news/Wall Street Journal Survey, June 12, 2006.

Methods

The survey – The Federation of American Scientists, in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, developed a survey to gather baseline data on the prevailing points of view of scientists towards the law enforcement community. The survey contained a mix of multiple choice and open-ended questions. In collaboration with the American Association for the Advancement of Science the survey was distributed to 10,969 AAAS member scientists over a four-week period between January 23 and February 18, 2008. AAAS members were selected if they had a functional email address and had identified their primary field of study as biology, chemistry, physics, earth science, or engineering. Emails contained a link to a secure website where members could answer the survey questions. At the end of the time period 1,332 surveys were completed, and the resulting data were analyzed. The data were statistically weighted to be proportionally representative of the scientific disciplines of the AAAS membership. The margin of error associated with the total data set is +/- 2.7 percent.

Thermometer rating system – Two survey questions asked respondents to indicate their feelings towards a particular person, organization, or situation using a thermometer system. In this type of question, respondents give their response as any number between 0 and 100, with 100 being a very warm, favorable feeling, and 0 being a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold.

Table 1

Complete list of questions asked in the survey.

Question 1. Please indicate your feelings toward the following people and organizations with 100 meaning a VERY WARM, FAVORABLE feeling; 0 meaning a VERY COLD, UNFAVORABLE feeling; and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0 to 100, where the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that person or organization.

Local law enforcement Institutional Review Board (IRB)

State level law enforcement Campus police

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Head of your department

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Private grantmaking organizations

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government grantmaking organizations

Private security, such as those found at private research centers

Question 2. The following people and organizations might have some role in monitoring scientific research under certain circumstances. Please indicate your feelings about each one having some role in monitoring scientific research under certain circumstances, with 100 meaning a VERY WARM, FAVORABLE feeling; 0 meaning a VERY COLD, UNFAVORABLE feeling; and 50 meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0 to 100, where the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that person or organization having some role in monitoring scientific research under certain circumstances.

Local law enforcement Institutional Review Board (IRB)

State level law enforcement Campus police

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Head of your department

Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Private grantmaking organizations

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Government grantmaking organizations

Private security, such as those found at private research centers

Question 3. From time to time, individuals other than your immediate colleagues might be interested in the work you do. Please indicate how receptive you would be to sharing details of your work for each of the following:

Federal law enforcement agent State level politician

State law enforcement officer Federal level politician

Local law enforcement Private sector scientist

An official from a regulatory agency Public sector scientist

An agent from an intelligence agency Academic/non-profit scientist

Corporate executive in a related industry A journalist

Private citizen with an interest in science

Question 4. There are many reasons that an outside authority might want to talk to you in your role as a scientist. For each of the following, please indicate whether you believe it is an excellent, good, fair, or poor reason for an outside authority want to talk to you. 1 = Excellent, 2 = Good, 3 = Fair, 4 = Poor

Intellectual curiosity about your area of research

To evaluate a research grant you have applied for

To assess issues surrounding an intellectual property case

To be evaluated by an Institutional Review Board (IRB)

To have government regulators evaluate the research as a potential public safety risk

To have law enforcement evaluate the research as a potential public safety risk

To be shared with law enforcement to aid in an ongoing criminal investigation

To be shared with law enforcement to aid in an ongoing terrorism investigation

To be evaluated by an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)

To have law enforcement evaluate if the research is a potential target of theft of foreign intelligence agencies

Question 5. Now you are going to see some pairs of statements about working with (SPLIT A – Law enforcement officers, SPLIT B – FBI Agents) who sometimes need to talk with scientists in the course of their duties. After reading each pair of statements, please indicate whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes closer to your own view, even if neither is exactly right. 1 = FIRST statement STRONGLY, 2 = FIRST statement NOT SO STRONGLY, 3 = SECOND statement NOT SO STRONGLY, 4 = SECOND statement STRONGLY I trust them OR I am suspicious of them

I believe that they are on my side OR I believe they are working against me

They understand my work OR They don’t understand my work

They work well with the science community OR They do not work well with the science community

They are primarily interested in the scientific value of my work OR They are primarily interested in restricting my work for security purposes

Scientists working closely with law enforcement agents is good for the scientific community OR Scientists working closely with law enforcement agents is bad for the scientific community

Some science needs to be kept under tight security and not released to the public for safety or security reasons OR All science should be made open to the public once it is ready for publication

More security equals more censorship OR More security does not equal more censorship

Question 6. There are many reasons that (SPLIT A – a law enforcement officer, SPLIT B- an FBI agent) might want to talk with a scientist. For each of the following, please indicate whether you believe it is an excellent, good, fair, or poor reason for (SPLIT A – a law enforcement officer, SPLIT B- an FBI agent) to approach a scientist. 1 = Excellent, 2 = Good, 3 = Fair, 4 = Poor

To clarify the nature of the scientist’s research

For the evaluation of the scientist’s research as a potential public health risk

To assess intellectual property rights issues related to the scientist’s research

To aid in an ongoing criminal investigation

To aid in an ongoing terrorism investigation

To request technical expertise in a particular area of science or technology

To interview the scientist because they are listed as the sponsor of a foreign student or researcher

To evaluate if a scientist’s work has possible alternate applications that might constitute a security risk, sometimes called “dual-use” research

To help safeguard it from theft by potential terrorists

To inquire about the activities of one of your colleagues that is an American citizen

To inquire about the activities of one of your colleagues that is not an American citizen

For the evaluation of the scientist’s research as a potential national security risk

Question 7. Suppose you received a message that a (SPLIT A- Law enforcement officer, SPLIT B- FBI agent) wanted to speak with you in your capacity as a scientist. For many people, this might raise some concerns about why the (LE officer/Agent) would want to contact them. Please indicate how concerned would you be that the (LE officer/Agent) would… 1 = Very concerned, 2 = Somewhat concerned, 3 = Not too concerned, 4 = Not at all concerned.

Read your personal emails

Ask you to monitor the activities of one of your colleagues

Investigate immigration issues related to you or one of your colleagues

Interfere with you conducting your research

Misinterpret your research as a potential public safety risk

Misinterpret your international travel as evidence of illegal activities

Stop you from publishing your research

Interfere with your research funding

Embarrass you in the eyes of your colleagues

Question 8. If you saw something suspicious happening in your workplace that made you concerned about a potential threat to public safety, who would you feel comfortable reporting to?

Your department head A federal law enforcement officer

Your immediate supervisor A local law enforcement officer

An institutional safety committee A state law enforcement officer

Public safety/security officer affiliated with your institution

An institutional review board

Other (Specify)

Question 9. Have you or any of your colleagues ever been approached by (SPLIT A – a member of law enforcement, SPLIT B – an FBI agent) to discuss something related to your work as a scientist? If yes, Please describe the circumstances under which you were approached by (SPLIT A – a member of law enforcement, SPLIT B – an FBI agent) to discuss something related to your work as a scientist.

Question 10. What is the best way for (SPLIT A – Law enforcement officers, SPLIT B – FBI Agents) to contact a scientist?

Question 11. What could (SPLIT A – a member of law enforcement, SPLIT B – an FBI agent) do to improve relations with the scientific community?

Question 12. What could scientists do to improve relations with the (SPLIT A – law enforcement community, SPLIT B – the FBI )?

Question 13. What is your gender?

Male Female

Question 14. In what year were you born?

Question 15. Which of the following best describes the current stage of your career?

Undergraduate Laboratory technician

Graduate student Academic staff scientist

Post doctorate Lab manager

Primary investigator Retired

Industry scientist

Question 16. Please indicate how often you work with foreign nationals in you capacity as a scientist.

Often Never

Sometimes I am a foreign national

Rarely

Question 17. Please indicate the highest biosafety level (BSL) work environment you have worked in.

BSL1 BSL4

BSL2 I have never worked in a facility with biosafety levels

BSL3 I don’t know

Question 18. Please indicate which of the following materials you work with in your capacity as a scientist:

Animals Explosive, corrosive, or otherwise toxic chemicals

Viruses Radioactive isotopes

Bacteria Select agents

Fungi Nuclear material

Human subjects None of the above

Question 19. Please mark the category that best describes the sector you are employed in as a scientist.

Academic Military

Government, but not military Private sector

Question 20. Please indicate the level of security in your current workplace.

High (Military level security)

Medium (Secure facility, picture ID required for access, armed guards)

Low (Restricted access to facility, some security personnel presence)

Minimal (Basic locks on doors, no restricted access to facility)

Corpus Callosum/NOAA

The Center for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Biocontainment BSL-4 Lab at the University of Texas Medical Branch suffered minimal damage during Hurricane Ike.

The impact of Hurricane Ike on the research labs in the storm’s path is generating a small number of headlines. At the end of last week, Science reported on the state of things at the University of Texas Medical Branch:

The UTMB campus stands on the eastern portion of the island, behind the seawall the city constructed after a hurricane devastated the town in 1900. The wall held during Ike, sparing the campus much of the destruction experienced across the rest of Galveston, where whole neighborhoods washed away. Overall, Hurricane Ike killed 50 people in the Gulf Coast and left millions more without power for a week. But the Galveston National Laboratory, a $167 million facility designed for the study of biohazards, suffered minimal damage, says the lab’s associate director, James LeDuc. UTMB’s biosafety level 4 lab, which holds samples of microbes such as anthrax and plague bacteria, also emerged unscathed. Elsewhere on the island, Texas A&M University’s Galveston research facilities suffered virtually no damage, says campus CEO R. Bowen Loftin.

Before the storm, the bloggers at Effect Measure expressed severe skepticism about the logic of locating a lab with such deadly pathogens on a barrier island. Another ScienceBlogger at Corpus Callosum points out that while the Center for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Biocontainment BSL-4 Lab was built to resist 140-mile-an-hour winds, other buildings in Galvenston were not. Storm damage elsewhere lead to a buildup of environmental hazards like “mud, human waste, asbestos, lead and gasoline,” that posed a severe risk to health of the city.

While the UTMB lab is secure, the campus has not reopened, and scientists, like so many other Galveston residents, cannot yet return to work.

The problem is that we (myself included) have not taken the long-view on this issue.

Dual-use research has been the subject of much discussion in the biosecurity community since the 2003 release of the National Research Council report, Biotechnology Research in the Age of Terrorism, which suggested that, “Adequately addressing the potential risks that research in advanced biotechnology could be misused by hostile parties will require educating the community of life scientists, both about the nature of these risks and about the responsibilities of scientists to address and manage them.” But convincing scientists that they should add dual-use research awareness and evaluations to their already long list of idiosyncratic worries turned out to be far harder than anyone imagined.

Enter the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. In June of last year, the NSABB released their Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research, in which the board recommend that life scientists receive “mandatory education about dual-use research issues and policies,” with the goal of “ensure(ing) that all individuals engaged in life sciences research are aware of the concerns and issues regarding dual use research and their roles and responsibilities in the oversight of such research.”

In addition to mandatory training, both the National Research Council and the NSABB have advocated for the creation of codes of conduct for life sciences researchers that includes dual-use awareness. Now, research societies are preparing and implementing their codes of conduct, infusing another layer of awareness into the research community.

Indeed, it will not be long before it is mandatory that all federal grantees in the life sciences receive such training, and that all biologists sign codes of conduct. Awareness will spread like happy little dandelions. That is until someone points out that they are weeds.

Don’t get me wrong. I am an advocate of mandatory training and think codes of conduct are a good tool for increasing awareness. Not least of the reasons for my support being that the Federation of American Scientists arguably has the most extensive dual-use training materials available to date in the form of our multimedia Case Studies in Dual-Use Research. Wide distribution of these case studies and materials created by other groups has been a goal of ours from the time we started the project.

The problem is that we (myself included) have not taken the long-view on this issue. If we dramatically increase awareness, then we also increase the chances that scientists will have concerns about dual-use research or worse—suspicions that a colleague is up to no good. What the NSABB, National Research Council and the biosecurity community on the whole have failed to fully address is how those researchers should attend to their concerns. Government-issued guidelines for researchers will only get them so far.

Since part of the duty of a responsible researcher will certainly be reporting unsafe experiments or suspicious behavior, instituting codes of conduct and training all scientists makes potential whistleblowers out of every working biologist. This creates an immediate need for protocols and methods for scientists to get advice and report their concerns.

There is currently no reliable independent system in place for these researchers to report or receive advice on how to handle their concerns.

It is well recognized that a major barrier to reporting such incidents to law enforcement, supervisors, biosafety officers, or institutional review boards, is the fear of reprisal. This might also be compounded by some members of the scientific community not trusting government officials and law enforcement in particular. This extends from laboratory technicians and support staff to primary investigators. Even if there is no indication of foul play, scientists may feel that there are experiments being conducted at their institution that have serious dual-use implications, or that are dangerous to those conducting them and their colleagues.

There is currently no reliable independent system in place for these researchers to report or receive advice on how to handle their concerns. Such a system would be a valuable contribution to strengthening biosecurity awareness and participation within the biological research community. It should be pointed out that such a system is a good way to get across the idea that official whistle-blowing is not the first and only resort.

I and others have suggested that we need to build a secure Internet-based system where scientists will be able to report their concerns and receive advice and recommendations on the steps that they should or should not take. Concerns will naturally run the range of how to fill out dual-use reporting forms on grants to reporting potentially illegal situations in the lab. It is important that the government not operate the system to ensure buy in. Rather, an ombudsman network should be run by a non-government organization that will allow partial anonymity.

In the event that a clear cause of action is required, such as when a law is being broken, a non-government organization would be well-placed to help facilitate conversations with law enforcement, make queries on the behalf of the scientist to government, or alleviate concerns without endangering their status at the institute.

The system will have to be backed by a large group of advisors, including experts from multiple science disciplines, ethicists, legal and law enforcement representatives to ensure that users are receiving timely and accurate advice. The system administrator will have to be available at all times and have constant access to advisors in the case of a serious problem.

One major concern of scientists will be the preservation of anonymity. This issue can be simply handled by having staff farm out the query to advisors without revealing the identity of the scientist. Total anonymity, however, cannot be completely preserved in such a system.

In principle, users will turn to this system when they feel uncomfortable reporting concerns within their institution or when they are unsure of who to turn to. Responses will either ask for further information, clarification, or report back advice on the appropriate course of action.

Users must also feel comfortable that the information they divulge will not be released to anyone unless they approve it. This can be accomplished by making users agree to simple terms before sending their query. Those terms will detail operation standards and will inform users under which conditions the managers have a legal responsibility to inform appropriate authorities, and that they may be contacted by such authorities directly in the event that a law has been or is about to be broken.

Detailed records of responses and customizable electronic form letters will allow us to provide useful assistance and inform users of their rights and the laws that might apply to them in a timely manner. It should be stressed that in the event a user reports an imminent threat, they will automatically receive instructions on who they should contact. There are several important issues that will have to be addressed while developing a biosecurity reporting system, among them:

Whistleblower Laws. The United States has a well-established set of “whistleblower” laws that protect people from reprisals for reporting. There are several excellent non-profit groups that specialize in this area and it will be important to bring them in for legal advice and possibly to present a series of Frequently Asked Questions on the site for scientists to learn about their options.

Legal Advice. We will need legal advice on a broad range of issues, including the liability associated with giving advice, maintaining anonymity, the situations under which those with knowledge of possible crimes are legally obligated to contact law enforcement, and applicable laws for users.

Advisory Boards. An advisory board consisting of scientists, ethicists, biosecurity experts, and legal advisors will have to be brought in for the design and implementation. A second advisory board will have to be available for advice on individual cases. It will be important to have a wide array of expertise and knowledge on hand to address any reports that come in.

Law Enforcement Guidelines. A clear relationship with law enforcement will need to be established so that in the event that there is a user who is uncomfortable going to law enforcement themselves, we would be able to report an incident on their behalf.

Testing. It will be necessary to test the system through a series of table-top scenarios that provide challenges to our response times and content.

It is a virtual certainty that this type of system would eventually be abused maliciously against other scientists trying to slow down a competitor, or exact revenge. In that sense, the system itself would have dual-use potential and like science, safeguards and awareness will reduce, but might not eliminate, unfortunate incidences.

It is also hard to predict how often such a system would be used and what percentage of the time it would receive cranks. But it is equally unclear to what degree dual-use research is a threat to national security. If we are going to require scientists to learn about the potential for misuse, then it is essential that they have a place to turn if they recognize potential misuse or have questions about complying with legal and ethical requirements.

Michael Stebbins is the Director of Biology Policy for the Federation of American Scientists, President of the SEA Action Fund and author of Sex, Drugs and DNA: Science’s Taboos Confronted.

Ellen Laipson, President and CEO of the Henry L Stimson Center, opened by laying out the current state of affairs in international security. Asian countries, especially China and India, are rising powers on the global stage. Nuclear technology leakage to non-state actors, chemical and biological threats, climate change, failing or weak states, and environmental disasters are just a few of the current and future global threats. Addressing them will take an integrative and inclusive approach, she told the audience, calling experts from health, environmental, and security fields to join forces in developing new paradigms for security issues.

Dr. Sagarin then explained how biological evolution on a uncertain and dangerous planet has operated as a 3.6-billion-year test period for security and defense mechanisms that both do and don’t work. Looking at the “solutions” provided by nature could teach humans how to deal with their own security issues, he argues. He suggests events such as the 9/11 attacks where not the effect of a “failure of imagination,”as the 9/11 Commission Report found, but are rather a “failure of adaptation.”

What are examples of natural security? Sagarin notes how the Cold War arms race between superpowers Russia and the U.S. was similar to male fiddler crabs waving large and relatively useless claws while competing with other male crabs for female attention. None of the male crabs actually use the claw in battle with competitors, and analogously, superpowers working with similar assumptions and resources nonetheless continued their competitive escalation.

He then explained that male peacocks use a great deal of energy and resources to grow beautiful manes of feathers which serve no purpose other than for wooing females. According to Sagarin, when male peacocks fully extend these feathers, they expose themselves to danger; a behavior that could have only developed in predator-free habitats. Recent news reports have found lax security at sensitive chemical plants because companies, he argues, behave much like peacocks, spending resources in research and development rather than on security because they developed during a period of relaxed security concerns.

Sagarin believes that studying evolutionary adaptations like the immune system and biomimicry, as well as evolutionary models in network science, could yield novel and effective security approaches. He sees four broad but interlocking themes in nature-inspired security:

• Structures that are highly centralized do not respond efficiently to the environment. For this, he cited the Department of Homeland Security and its failure to responded quickly to Hurricane Katrina.
• Most organisms increase uncertainty for adversaries while reducing uncertainties for themselves. Announcing security protocols at the airport runs counter to this principle, as it makes it easier for individuals with criminal intent to know what behaviors to avoid, he pointed out.
• Organisms live in a world of inherent risk. Instead of trying to eliminate all risk, he suggested, it is better to understand the nature of risk and apply resources accordingly.
• Natural systems are always changing, so security situations should be constantly reevaluated. Understanding what stage a system is in allows an administer to allocate the right tools appropriately.

Sagarin emphasized that security requires collaboration across a variety of disciplines and must involve both experts and non-experts to help develop new paradigms and perspectives to solve the problems of the future. To further this collaboration, he has started a website for individuals to offer their own perspectives and ideas.

SEED’s Science and Society blog has posted video of its Science and Society Series with Drew Endy and Annie-Marie Mazaa of the Committee on Science, Technology and Law at the National Academies. The two discuss synthetic biology: the technology behind it, the current state of research, and the legal and regulatory dilemmas it faces.

Expect only one minute of science and environment coverage in five hours of cable news programming, writes Matthew Nisbet at Framing Science. Taking a hard look at the recently released Pew “State of the Media” report, he explores the lack of science coverage on cable news networks.

How to combat the rise of drug-resistant antibiotics? In the wake of a new study indicating that U.S. citizens often fail to complete prescribed courses of antibiotics or use them to treat the wrong kind of infection, 60 Second Science suggests “education, education, education.”

Derek Lowe at In the Pipeline critiques a proposal from MIT professors Stan Finkelstein and Peter Temin for rethinking the drug development process. In their new book, “Resonable Rx: Solving the Drug Price Crisis,” they suggest breaking up the pharmaceutical business into drug discovery firms and drug marketing firms.

The United States Supreme Court ruled 8 to 1 on Wednesday that medical device makers are immune from liability for injuries as long as the devices were previously approved by the Food and Drug Administration. The legal question behind the case pertained to whether or not Federal law (specifically, the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) can preempt state-based lawsuits. Next Monday, the Supreme Court will hear another FDA-related case which explores further the rights of states to challenge FDA decisions.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have been fairly successful over the years in predicting the most virulent flu strains and then formulating vaccines based on those predictions. This year was an exception. The current vaccine is most effective against fewer than half of the strains that are most dominant in the human population. Government researchers are presently deciding which strains next year’s vaccine should target, and they have decided, in an unusual move, to leave out two of the strains targeted by the present vaccine and replace them with two new strains next year. How well vaccine makers will adapt to the CDC decision in time to produce 100 million doses by the fall remains to be seen. The Knight Science Journalism Tracker has a full roundup of coverage.